

# A Note on Distributed Stable Matching

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


presented by Ofir Reginiano  
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## Matching

- men & women
- each man ranks the women
- each woman ranks the men
- a **matching** (marriage)  $M$  matches each man with a woman

## example



Preferences


	□ → ○	○ → □
1	1 3 2	① 2 1 3
2	3 2 1	② 3 1 2
3	1 2 3	③ 1 3 2

## Stable Matching


- **(i, j) blocking**: both  $i$  and  $j$  prefer each other to their matches under  $M$
- **stable matching**: a matching without any blocking pair



## example



Stable matching



Preferences

	□ → ○			○ → □			
1	1	3	2	①	2	1	3
2	3	2	1	②	3	1	2
3	1	2	3	③	1	3	2

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## outline

- Motivation
- Problem Statement
  - DSM
- Time Lower Bound
  - Mailing Problem
  - DSM >> Mailing Problem
- $\epsilon$ -DSM
  - Algorithm
  - Time Upper Bound



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## Motivation

- Gale and Shapley (1962)
  - SM exists
  - $O(n^2)$
- Gusfield and Irving (1989)
  - ties
  - unacceptable pairs
- 3 way SM
  - *men, women, dogs*
- Stable Roommates (SR) problem
- Scheduling network switches



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
## DSM – Distributed Stable Matching

- $G = (V, E)$  undirected bipartite
- each node ranks its neighbors
- matching = a set of disjoint edges
- synchronous model
- in each round, each processor can send a message to each of its neighbors
- CONGEST model – a message may contain up to  $B$  bits (e.g.  $B = \theta(\log n)$ )

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
# The Mailing Problem

- disjoint sets  $S, R \subseteq V$  (senders and receivers)




# The Graph Family G

- $G_{\Gamma, m, p}$   $m \geq 1$  odd  $n = \theta(\Gamma \cdot m)$



# $G_{\Gamma, m, p}$ properties

- $G_{\Gamma, m, p} \in G$  is bipartite
- diameter:  $d = 2p+4$



# Mailing Problem in $G_{\Gamma, m, p}$

- $m = \left(\frac{n}{p \cdot B}\right)^{1/2 - \frac{1}{2(2p+1)}}$
- Any deterministic protocol that delivers at least  $c \cdot \Gamma$  bits correctly ( $0.8 < c \leq 1$  const) requires  $\Omega(m)$  rounds




## special cases

$$m = \left(\frac{n}{p \cdot B}\right)^{1/2 - \frac{1}{2(2p+1)}}$$

- $p = 1 \dots \log(n)$
- $p = 1 \rightarrow d = 6$

$$\left(\frac{n}{\log n}\right)^{\frac{1}{3}} \text{ rounds}$$



- $p = \log(n)$
- $\left(\frac{n}{\log^2 n}\right)^{\frac{1}{2}} \text{ rounds}$

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## alternating path


- blue edges  $\subseteq M$  and green edges  $\cap M = \emptyset$ , or vice versa



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## Reduce Mating Problem to DSM Problem


- in the d-ary tree:
  - vertices with even distance from the root: their leftmost child – most preferred
  - others: their parent – most preferred
- on the paths  $P_j$ :



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Lemma: Under any stable matching,  $P_j$  is an alternating path for all  $1 \leq j \leq \Gamma$

case 1:  $i \neq 1$




in  $M$   
not in  $M$

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Lemma: Under any stable matching,

$P_j$  is an **alternating path** for all  $1 \leq j \leq \Gamma$


case 2:  $i = 1$



in M  
not in M


Lemma: Under any stable matching,

$P_j$  is an **alternating path** for all  $1 \leq j \leq \Gamma$



## corollaries

- only 2 possible matchings along each  $P_j$ 
  - determined only by the preference of  $v_{1,j}$
  - do not depend on the tree



- Any deterministic algorithm for DSM requires  $\Omega(D)$  rounds ( $D$  – diameter)

## $\rho$ -approximation

- $\rho$ -approximation matching if it induces at most  $(1-\rho)n$  blocking pairs
- $\rho = 1 \rightarrow$  “regular” case



## A Time Lower Bound on DSM Problem


- any deterministic  $\rho$ -approximation
- $\rho = 1 - o(1/\sqrt{n})$
- diameter  $D \in \{6, 8, 10, \dots\}$
- The algorithm requires

$$\Omega\left(D + \left(\frac{n}{D \cdot B}\right)^{\frac{1}{2} - \frac{1}{2(D-3)}}\right)$$

communication rounds

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## Proof

- reduction: Mailing problem  $\rightarrow$  DSM
- input:  $X_j^s, \dots, X_j^r$  to the mailing problem in  $G$
  - construct a DSM instance:
    - preferences of all nodes, except the senders, are fixed
    - $v_{1,j}$  depends if  $X_j^s = 1$  (or 0) 
    - when DSM terminates, each node knows its match
  - output transformation: receivers  $v_{m-1,j}$   
 set  $X_j^r = 1 \iff (v_{m-1,j}, v_{m,j})$  is in the matching

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## Proof – cont.

- suppose  $M$  is a  $\rho$ -approximate stable matching
- # blocking pairs  $\leq (1-\rho)n = o(\sqrt{n})$
- # paths  $P_j$  without any blocking pair  $\geq \Gamma - o(\sqrt{n})$
- # paths  $P_j$  which are alternating  $\geq \Gamma - o(\sqrt{n})$
- output variables in the receivers are correct
- $\Gamma = \theta(n/m) \gg \sqrt{n}$
- # correct bits delivered using the reduction  $\geq \Gamma(1 - o(1))$
- running time under these specific graphs is

$$\Omega\left(\left(\frac{n}{D \cdot B}\right)^{\frac{1}{2} - \frac{1}{2(D-3)}}\right)$$

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## Corollary - Time Lower Bound

- Any deterministic  $\rho$ -approximation for DSM graph's diameter  $\theta(\log n)$   
 $\rho = 1 - o(1/\sqrt{n})$   
 requires  $\Omega\left(\sqrt{\frac{n}{B \cdot \log n}}\right)$  rounds



even if we allow  $\sqrt{n}$  blocking pairs in the output !

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## some notations...

- $Pref_v$   
preference – ordered list of all neighbors of node  $v$ .
- $Pref_v(u) = i$   $u$  is the  $i$ -th node in  $Pref_v$   
 $Pref_v(u) = 1$  (most preferred) , ...  
 $\infty$  (not a neighbor)
- $(u, v) \in M \leftrightarrow M(v) = u$  and  $M(u) = v$
- $v$  is unmatched under  $M \rightarrow Pref_v(M(v)) = \infty$


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## Extension: $\epsilon$ -DSM

- $0 \leq \epsilon \leq 1$
- Stability is violated only when there is a pair that can improve their matches “a lot” by matching to each other
- $(u, v)$   **$\epsilon$ -blocking pair** with respect to  $M$  if  $Pref_v(u) < Pref_v(M(v)) - \epsilon |Pref_v|$  and  $Pref_u(v) < Pref_u(M(u)) - \epsilon |Pref_u|$
- exact case:  $\epsilon \leq 1/(n+1)$

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
## example



Preferences							
	$\square \rightarrow \circ$			$\circ \rightarrow \square$			
$\square 1$	1	3	2	$\circ 1$	2	1	3
$\square 2$	3	2	1	$\circ 2$	3	1	2
$\square 3$	1	2	3	$\circ 3$	1	3	2

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## $G^{\epsilon\text{-DSM}}$




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**Lemma:** for any  $\varepsilon < \frac{l+1}{2l+3}$

$P_j$  is an **alternating path** for all  $1 \leq j \leq \Gamma$

e.g. case:  $(i+1) \neq m$   
 $i \neq 1$




$$\text{Pref}_{v_{i,j}}(z_i) - \text{Pref}_{v_{i,j}}(v_{i+1,j}) = l+1 > \varepsilon \cdot |\text{Pref}_{v_{i,j}}|$$

$$\text{Pref}_{v_{i+1,j}}(M(v_{i+1,j})) - \text{Pref}_{v_{i+1,j}}(v_{i,j}) \geq l+1 > \varepsilon \cdot |\text{Pref}_{v_{i+1,j}}|$$

in  $M$   
 not in  $M$


**Lemma:** for any  $\varepsilon < \frac{l+1}{2l+3}$

$P_j$  is an **alternating path** for all  $1 \leq j \leq \Gamma$



## ε-DSM result

- Any deterministic  $\rho$ -approximation  $\rho = 1 - o(1/\sqrt{n})$
- diameter  $D \in \{10, 12, 14, \dots\}$
- $\varepsilon < 1/2$  constant
- requires  $\Omega\left(D + \left(\frac{n}{D \cdot B}\right)^{\frac{1}{2} - \frac{1}{2(D-3)}}\right)$  rounds



## ε-DSM algorithm

- an extension of Gale and Shapley alg.
- a termination detection
- bipartite graph – 2 node sets:
  - active** – may only propose
  - passive** – may only reject
- proceed in double rounds



## u active



if  $M(u) = \text{null}$  then

$v \leftarrow$  most preferred passive node on  $\text{Pref}_u$

propose to  $v$

$M(u) \leftarrow v$

for all  $v \in \text{reject}_u$  do

if  $M(u) = v$  then

$M(u) \leftarrow \text{null}$

remove  $v$  from  $\text{Pref}_u$

$\text{reject}_u \leftarrow \text{null}$

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## v passive


$\text{candidate} \leftarrow$  most preferred active node on  $\text{proposers}_v$

remove  $\text{candidate}$  from  $\text{proposers}_v$

for all  $u \in \text{proposers}_v$  do

reject  $u$

remove  $u$  from  $\text{Pref}_v$



if  $M(v) = \text{null}$  then

$M(v) \leftarrow \text{candidate}$

else if  $\text{Pref}_v(\text{candidate}) < \text{Pref}_v(M(v)) - \epsilon \cdot \text{degree}_v$  then

reject  $M(v)$


remove  $M(v)$  from  $\text{Pref}_v$

$M(v) \leftarrow \text{candidate}$

else

reject  $\text{candidate}$

remove  $\text{candidate}$  from  $\text{Pref}_v$




for all  $u \in \text{Pref}_v$  do

if  $\text{Pref}_v(u) \geq \text{Pref}_v(M(v)) - \epsilon \cdot \text{degree}_v$  then

reject  $u$

remove  $u$  from  $\text{Pref}_v$



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## Round : 1

[http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Stable\\_marriage\\_problem](http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Stable_marriage_problem)


Proposors



Acceptors



Proposal pool



• 1-4 propose, as none are currently tentatively attached

## Preferences

○ → □

Proposor Table

1	2	1	3	4
2	4	1	2	3
3	1	3	2	4
4	2	3	1	4

□ → ○


Acceptor Table

1	1	3	2	4
2	3	4	1	2
3	4	2	3	1
4	3	2	1	4

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## Round : 1


Proposors



Acceptors



Proposal pool



• 1 accepts 3's proposal—no better offer.  
• 2 accepts 4's proposal as 4 is more preferable to 1.  
• 3 receives no offer.  
• 4 accepts 2's proposal—no better offer.

## Preferences

○ → □

Proposor Table

1	2	1	3	4
2	4	1	2	3
3	1	3	2	4
4	2	3	1	4


□ → ○

Acceptor Table

1	1	3	2	4
2	3	4	1	2
3	4	2	3	1
4	3	2	1	4

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## Round : 2




• 1, the only un-attached member makes its offer to 1, its first preference not previously proposed to.

### Preferences

○ → □					□ → ○				
Proposor Table					Acceptor Table				
①	2	1	3	4	①	1	3	2	4
②	4	1	2	3	②	3	4	1	2
③	1	3	2	4	③	4	2	3	1
④	2	3	1	4	④	3	2	1	4

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## Round : 2



• 1 drops 3's proposal in favour of as this is higher in its preference table. 3 returns to the proposal pool.

### Preferences

○ → □					□ → ○				
Proposor Table					Acceptor Table				
①	2	1	3	4	①	1	3	2	4
②	4	1	2	3	②	3	4	1	2
③	1	3	2	4	③	4	2	3	1
④	2	3	1	4	④	3	2	1	4

## Round : 3




• 3 proposes to 3

### Preferences

○ → □					□ → ○				
Proposor Table					Acceptor Table				
①	2	1	3	4	①	1	3	2	4
②	4	1	2	3	②	3	4	1	2
③	1	3	2	4	③	4	2	3	1
④	2	3	1	4	④	3	2	1	4

## Round : 3




• 3 accepts 3, not having a better offer

### Preferences

○ → □					□ → ○				
Proposor Table					Acceptor Table				
①	2	1	3	4	①	1	3	2	4
②	4	1	2	3	②	3	4	1	2
③	1	3	2	4	③	4	2	3	1
④	2	3	1	4	④	3	2	1	4

## Finish



• No two members {P,A} would prefer one-another over their current pairing

## Preferences

	Proposor Table				Acceptor Table				
	1	2	3	4	1	2	3	4	
1	2	1	3	4	1	1	3	2	4
2	4	1	2	3	2	3	4	1	2
3	1	3	2	4	3	4	2	3	1
4	2	3	1	4	4	3	2	1	4

## Alg. Termination

- when there are no more rejected nodes
- termination detection mechanism:
  - each rejected node broadcasts (on a shortest-path tree) that the protocol has not terminated yet
  - a node halts if D (graph's diameter) consecutive steps pass without any such broadcast received



## Alg. Time Complexity

$\epsilon$ -DSM can be solved on any graph in  $O(D + \min(|E|, \epsilon^{-1}n))$

### Proof:

- $O(D)$  to find the value of D and to detect termination
- before stabilization of the matching
  - in each round at least one passive node improves the rank of its match by at least a fraction  $\epsilon$ .  
→ the total number of rounds is  $O(\epsilon^{-1}n)$
  - in each round at least one fresh active node is rejected by a passive node  
→ num. of rounds is also bounded by  $|E|$

## Conclusion

- stable Marriage problem in a distributed model
- bounded length messages
- any alg. requires  $\Omega(\sqrt{n/B \log n})$  communication rounds in the worst case
- even for graphs of diameter  $O(\log n)$
- even if allowing  $O(\sqrt{n})$  blocking pairs in the output
- our lower bound extends to  $\epsilon$ -stability ( $\epsilon \sim 1/2$ )
- our best upper bound is  $O(|E|)$  communication rounds, or  $O(\epsilon^{-1}n)$  for  $\epsilon$ -DSM

