...Reich

Presently at The Faculty of Engineering, Tel Aviv University, Ramat Aviv 69978, Israel

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...behaving.

I choose not to use the term being since it may have a passive, indifferent connotation. Behaving, on the other hand, involves action, therefore, does not conceal that it has consequences.

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...practice.

There are notable exceptions to this statement, namely Marx and Heidegger. See note 4 about the latter.

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...exceptions,

See Mallery, Hurwitz, and Duffy's (1986) discussion on the influence of philosophy on research on natural language understanding, Winograd and Flores' (1986) and Floyd, /, Budde, and Keil-Slawik's (1992) discussions on the philosophical foundations of the design of computer systems, and Arbib and Hesse's (1986) discussion on the relationships between philosophy and schema theory.

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...ideas.

The reader may view places in the text where he or she feels that a reference to Heidegger's (1927) Being and Time may be appropriate. Such reference will not be made. Heidegger demonstrated the extreme separation between ideas and practice: While philosophizing about the nature of Being, he became a member of the Nazi party from 1933 to 1945. His silence about the Nazi's atrocities during, but more importantly after, World War II demonstrated his contribution to the denial of the Being of millions of people. I leave it to Heidegger's followers to try and reconcile his theory and practice. See also, /' (1989) Heidegger and Nazism, and Neske and Kettering's (1990) Martin Heidegger and National Socialism: Questions and Answers, for a significant elaboration on this subject.

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...paradigm

The   term paradigm used by Guba (1990) is related to, but different than, Kuhn's (1962) term. Kuhn's term was fuzzy, (if we judge by the many different ways it is used in his book,) and reflected a post-hoc analysis of historical events, whereas Guba's term is more precise and can be consciously selected to provide guidance in research. Guba's paradigm is an entity that materializes in the way it addresses three basic issues: ontology, epistemology, and methodology. Guba's term seems closer to Lakatos' (1987) notion of research programme than to Kuhn's paradigm. See also Kourany's (1987), p. 112-121, for a summary of the different views about the progress of science including Kuhn's and Lakatos'.

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...methodology

I explicitly do not use the term paradigm because, similar to Kuhn, I view the term as being fuzzy. Furthermore, I do not think that paradigms can be consciously selected based on some criteria; this to me is a positivist notion. See also note 5 and other chapters in Guba (1990) opposing the ``discrete'' notion of the term paradigm.

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...science.

Note that although Argyris and / critic can improve PAR, their view is still within the positivist paradigm since control over research rests in the hands of researchers and is not distributed to other participants. Elsewhere, Argyris (1980) and / (1983) expanded these ideas in ways that can easily and mistakenly be perceived as similar to PAR. However, in other publications they provided a detailed analysis of the defensive routines used by individuals and organizations [Argyris1985], thus giving tools for manipulating these routines to obtain a desired change. See also Waring (1991), for a review of central ideas in management theory including similar categorization of Argyris' views.

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...parties.

The concept of participation is not always acceptable from the perspective of architects-the agents mediating between the customer agency and the user community-who instead of attending to the customer, often develop myths about authoritative rationality and aesthetics judgment [Ward1989].

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...attention.

In is interesting to note Hollomon's reference to a statement by Solomonov from the Academy of Science of the former U.S.S.R:

The power of contemporary science and technology is such that they can, in principle, provide the highest level of well-being for all people on the globe. But capitalist society is organically incapable, by virtue of private vested interests, of fixing this goal as an organized aim of society and state. (p. 110)

This criticism is more valid than Hollomon's own closing statement on the challenges engineers face in modern society: ``I believe that engineers will not fail to accept this supreme challenge to our way of life. We-you and me-must meet it.'' (p. 110)

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...use.

There is seemingly a similar trend in design research to work on the capturing of such data as ``design rationale,'' augment it with additional knowledge-bases and use it to generate better designs. The shared memory is different than this attempt at ``objectifying'' knowledge, in that shared memory always refers to specific contexts. Any generalization is subjected to revisions and is still attached to the context in which it was generated.

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...alternative).

See Nowakowski's reaction to Reinharz`s chapter where she noted that ``to accommodate the metaphor, for example, of gender, one has to accept the stereotype of the metaphor (i.e., female equates with soft and weak, and male with hard and strong) as well as the stereotype of the paradigms.'' (p. 309) I argue with Reinharz that one need not accept the stereotypes, one can oppose them, but still acknowledge that they are more than often put to use by others.

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...activity.

See Arnett (1986), p. 134, for an example.

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...shrank.

Similarly, Toulmin (1972, vii) evaluated the philosophy subsequent to the Greeks to be a footnote to Plato.

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...ideas.

Simon's ideas about design science, rationality, hierarchical human organizations as an evolutionary response to complexity, etc. do not remain without criticism. For a recent explicit critic on Simon's ideas, see Waring (1991), while for a critic on the dogmatic use of ``rational'' models of decision theory in social science and administration management, see Habermas (in McCarthy, 1978).

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...progress

Technological progress in this context means the ability to develop better, larger artifacts, but certainly not answering crucial questions such as the ethical problems technology raises.

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...goals,

I do not deal here with how the understanding of these cultures and techniques is obtained. One can argue that this understanding already involves the ability to impersonate members of these cultures because this problem is just an instance of the classic problem of achieving objectivity in hermeneutics. In addition, the impersonation process involves a therapeutic process whereby the person undertaking these goals understands his or her present wrong behavior and is willing to engage in its modification.

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...enough,

Some may argue that customer will is enough and, furthermore, that tough customers can lead to good designs [Gardiner and Rothwell1985]. They, must however, also acknowledge that doing business with tough customers may involve substantial risks and possibly failures.

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...philosophies.

Fujisawa (1959) described the new combination as a harmony where ``Shinto is the root and stem and Confucianism the leaves and branches, while Buddhism is the flowers and fruits.'' (p. 2)

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...examples.

In Scandinavia, hard living conditions over centuries, sparse population, and relatively freedom from occupation have led to a strong sense of dependability and an appreciation of the need of each individual to attain the highest quality of living [Floyd et al1989, Scott1975]. This humanistic driven pragmatism has evolved through favorable historical course of events into a culture committed to attaining good quality of life through: long-range planning, attention to individual needs and interests, cooperation between different social groups, pragmatic use of technological innovations, etc. These cultural foundations have led to distinct methods of participation in many aspects of technological change [Floyd et al1989, Namioka and Schuler1990]. For another short but concise analysis of the differences between the German and the English/American traditions see Pusey (1987, p. 15-17).

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...Buber1958].

One can use these three categories to modify Popper's (or Levinson's) three-world schema. Instead of having nature, human, and communicated ideas as the three worlds, the ontology consists of dialogues with these three entities. This, however, is different from Buber's existentialist ontology.

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...behaving.

See note 1 on the choice of the term behaving.

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...discussion.

The extension from two to three links is mentioned by Rapp (1981): the philosopher Kapp (1877) viewed designing as imagination and a creation of an artifact as a material embodiment of the imagination; while the engineer Eyth (1905) included another phase: the successful dissemination of the artifact.

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...developments.

Luckily, we all live in the world, and as consumers, use various tools including those we may have designed in the past. This gives researchers some leverage in getting faster feedback, than if they waited for their tools/prescriptions/methodologies to be used by others only.

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...product.

Recently, Winograd and Flores (1986) used similar analysis to derive guidelines for designing. Their approach, however, falls short from solving the problem of design since it maintains the control of design by designers instead of advocating for participation of users in design. Their problem may be the result of using the wrong ontology: Heidegger's notion of being as a human's monologue, instead of Buber's notion of existence as a dialogue between a person and its world.

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...activity,

Even if one designs alone, the design problem posed and evolved and the values used to guide its solution are socially constructed.

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...activities.

It is interesting to see the objections professional raise about the necessity to expand the scope of design to broader issues that necessitate major participation effort. For example, a paragraph in a recent engineers' code of ethics, ``Engineers shall hold paramount the safety, health and welfare of the public in the performance of their professional duties,'' [American Engineerss' Council for Professional Development1974] stimulated discussion about its interpretation and feasibility. One objection was raised by Florman (1980).

If this appeal to conscience were to be followed literally, chaos would ensue. Ties of loyalty and discipline would dissolve and organizations would shatter. Blowing the whistle on one's superiors would become the norm, instead of a last and desperate resort. ... Engineers can (and should) contribute to public policy as citizens, but this is very different from filtering their everyday work through a sieve of ethical sensitivity. (p. 236)

This objection redirects attention from the crucial issues of social responsibility and how it can be supported to promoting unjustified fears from chaos.

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...is.

The building of systems that support human capabilities, such as understanding, is an empirical study of epistemology or constitutes experimental philosophy [Arbib and Hesse1986]. While this has always occurred in the past in an evolutionary manner, its impact is much more rapid today.

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