Most researchers in all fields of inquiry, too immersed in the old natural science metaphor of technology, pursue their work independent of practice; nevertheless, they believe that knowledge they generate ought to be used by practitioners. They accuse practitioners of not complying with this belief, while being accused by practitioners for not supplying the information practitioners need [de Neufville1986]. Such conflicts arise in diverse disciplines such as engineering design, public policy, education, and management. In fact, they occur in all disciplines involving humans activities.
A recent document of the American National Research Council (1991) described the poor relationship between engineering education, research and industry in the U.S.
With few exceptions, engineering design education and research is divorced from industry needs. For its part, industry does not articulate its requirements, support changes in the design component of curricula, or view education as an incubator of design talent. University design research efforts are often isolated from industry, and industry rarely uses the results of university research. (p. 12)
Similar concerns have already been raised in a previous document of the American National Academy of Sciences, albeit 24 years ago and with no apparent improvement [National Academy of Science1967]. While sections 4 and 5 attempt to explain the lack of attention towards such documents, this section elaborates on the views of the different contributors to the TPP.
Fishlock (1975) provided a vivid view of the scientist, reflecting a common metaphor of the researcher sitting in the ivory tower, pursuing work independent of reality.
Scientists generally, anarchists as most of them are at heart, have not showed themselves overly sympathetic to their patrons' problems. They were pleased to find themselves after the Second World War in favor with a public persuaded that, if simply left to their own devices, they would produce answers in their own time to society's more intractable problems. But they resented any attempt by the patron to channel their cogitation towards one of those problems. They saw themselves participating in what essentially was a cultural pursuit. Their attitude seemed to be, if the patron had a problem to solve, then he should recruit lesser mortals for the task. (p. 69)
Some researchers believe that the pragmatism of practitioners or the ``practical problems of daily life'' may distract them from attending to the fundamental principles of nature or society which they aught to uncover. Therefore, they reject establishing committed relationships with practitioners. Moreover, they complain that their funding agencies ask them to do so. Warfield (1990) illustrated this viewpoint, when discussing problems in obtaining funds for basic research in systems engineering which, according to Warfield, stem from the contradictory viewpoints of researchers and practitioners. Warfield contended that
the modern-day engineering and management community has worked itself unknowingly into a positivistic corner from which it lacks the imagination to escape. The leadership in American funding agencies has largely passed to , whose knowledge of science is often slight, and whose dominant concerns lie with applications and adherence to poorly-drawn regulations. (p. 215, emphasis in the original)
Not only do researchers face problems from funding agencies and
practitioners, they also have problems from
philosophers. That is, the
TPP also manifests itself in the relationships between different
professionals and philosophers. From the viewpoint of suppliers of
information such as research methodologies, most philosophers dealing with
technology do not develop their arguments to the extent that they can
influence research or practice.
The philosopher is a man wholly without influence, and he gained this unenviable position for himself by turning aside from philosophy to concentrate on the technical study of language; not its reference, mind you, which would take him outside language to the world, but only its meanings, which enables him to stay inside language, a kind of new scholasticism which leaves the real world to the care of others. ([Feibleman1982], p. 14)
From the other side, the public or professionals do not pay attention to philosophy.
The typically enlightened individual has already decided that because philosophers use ordinary words in extraordinary ways, he could make no sense of what they said and wrote; at the same time he felt that he need not bother because he was not missing anything important. ([Feibleman1982], p. 13)
The negative attitude towards philosophy persists with researchers
[Habermas1971]. Except for rare exceptions,
researchers do not consult philosophy in determining their research
methodologies or goals. Gasparski (1990),
citing a document called the Boston Manifesto written by Nadler about
planning and design (P+D) activities, warned against the ``lack of awareness of the epistemological foundation of P+D.'' (p. 191)
Finally, there is even a discrepancy between philosophers' positions and how
they practice philosophy. To illustrate, Feibleman (1976)
said that ``Hume working with the experiences
of the senses alone (and neglecting the importance of the fact that he was
thinking about them in so doing)'' (p. 169) did not preach that thinking is
important although he was using it to derive and articulate his
ideas. Such
discrepancies between statements and actions are practiced by other
professionals as well.
The symptom manifested in the examples presented in this section is the lack of dialogue or communication between the theory and practice aspects of a profession or between professions. The dialogue and its role in enabling consensual understanding are central to the research methodology proposed later.
While I briefly cited cases where theory and practice are divorced from each other, I have not dealt with crucial issues that these cases raise. For example, while discussing the American National Research Council Document (1991), I did not discuss whether industry needs should be the driver of education or research or whether building a bridge between industry and universities will solve the TPP. In another example, while citing Fishlock, I did not discussed whether the patrons of scientists should or should not determine the research questions. The cases mentioned served merely to demonstrate the lack of dialogue between theory and practice.
Several professions have noticed the problem of applying research results to practice. Fewer professions, such as education or political science, have tried to understand the problem from the philosophical perspective, and others, such as engineering design, have tried to look at remedying this practical problem by pursuing additional research from the same perspective.
Education
Some education researchers dealing with evaluating educational
programs and their improvements have recognized the flaws in the positivist
paradigm of
inquiry, and proposed to replace it by contemporary paradigms such as
postpositivism, critical theory, and constructivism [Guba1990].
Some researchers may view these paradigms as competing, but Guba, having a
pluralist view, proposed a dialogue between the paradigms without the intention to
identify one as the best, but with the hope that better paradigms will
emerge.
The collection edited by Guba (1990) contains papers, often with opposing views, on the issues central to paradigms such as ethics, implementation, and training. Elsewhere, Guba and Lincoln (1988) asserted that the selection of a paradigm entails the selection of its methodology, where methodology is the procedure guiding inquiry. Methodology is different from method, it includes the research method and its interpretation.
The success of the pluralistic view depends upon the dialogue between the
paradigms. If a dialogue is possible and fruitful, thus leading to better
paradigms, the pluralistic view may prove practical. Otherwise, the
pluralistic accommodation strategy will fragment any profession adopting it.
Note that the ability to engage in a dialogue departs from the
incommensurable nature of different paradigms according to Kuhn (1962). In
addition, true dialogue and change work against vested interests of
practitioners of different paradigms therefore most probably will be
rejected, an issue further discussed in the study. The uncertainty in the
possibility of a dialogue casts doubt about the practical results from
pluralism. The methodology I
propose later, relying on Buber's concept of a dialogue
[Arnett1986, Buber1972, Buber1958, Buber1964] and critical theory
[Geuss1981, Held1980, McCarthy1978], attempts to
facilitate this necessary dialogue.
Public policy
Public policy researchers and professionals have also recognized the divorced nature of policy implementation from its conception, another example of the TPP. The volume edited by Palumbo and Calista (1990) contains papers on the implementation process in public policy, focusing on studying the problems of implementation and their proposed solutions. Palumbo and Calista identified two types of studies: the top-down and the bottom-up approaches.
The top-down approach contends that any emphasis on implementation undermines the foundation of democratic politics. It is the right of the elected officials to exercise their power. In contrast, the bottom-up approach emphasizes implementation, thus, concentrating on incorporating the actions of bureaucrats and client behavior into policymaking. Some bottom-up studies are aimed at uncovering conditions under which implementation fails or succeeds. These conditions, however, are again being studied through the positivist lens by engaging by deriving objective knowledge through controlled experiments; thus, will be used for modifying policies, but still without involving clients in policymaking.
Linder and Peters (1990) criticized the over emphasis of the bottom-up approach of implementation as if it exclusively determines the success or failure of a policy. They proposed to view policymaking as a social design process involving different actors, processes, and actions. While expanding the view of policymaking, they remained within the positivist camp, aiming at designing better policies through objectively ``understanding'' why policies fail and not, for example, through the participation of clients.
Fox (1990) summarized that the problem of all approaches is that as long as policy analysis is positivist, the interaction between implementation and street clients will not be understood. But Fox did not fully recognize the importance of constant reflection on methodologies when arguing that: ``while practicing social scientists need not generally concern themselves with the philosophical underpinnings of their craft, in periods of paradigmatic turmoil a re-examination may be called for.'' (p. 200) The problem with this statement is that at times of reexamination, there is no one that can recall the foundations; and even if there was one, he or she will find it impossible to convince the remaining practitioners of the significance of attending to these foundations.
Social science
Social scientists also suffer from embracing the positivist view, thinking that their task is to discover basic scientific facts that eventually will be used in practice [Whyte et al1991]. The contributors to the volume edited by Whyte (1991) argued that a participation in research of an organization studied in a research projects, via a methodology called Participant Action Research (PAR), can improve both practice and theory. This claim went beyond merely the pragmatic transfer of theory into practice. The adoption of the new methodology was pragmatic: first, several experiences have showed that it works, and second, organizational behavior is too complex to limit researchers from accessing whatever inquiry method is available. PAR is close to the methodology proposed in this study. However, the present study goes beyond promoting a pragmatic view. It elaborates on the foundations of the new methodology and shows how difficult is, or may be, its adoption.
The adoption of PAR involves overcoming several difficulties. First, following the positivist tradition in natural sciences, most social scientists fear that PAR prevents the attainment of the desired scientific rigor. Second, the premise that PAR improves both theory and practice provides an incentive for researchers and owners/managers of organizations to engage in PAR. Unfortunately, almost always low-ranking organizational members are required to participate in PAR, and although advocates of the bureaucratic (and positivist) view of management would like us to believe that the workers interests correspond the owners' interests [Waring1991], these interests are usually conflicting. In fact, in the Xerox PAR project discussed by Whyte, Greenwood, and Lazes (1991) , the workers, facing layoffs, had no choice but to join the PAR project.
With respect to scientific rigor, Argyris and / (1991)
criticized the reasons given by Whyte
et al. for engaging in PAR and their written analysis of the Xerox PAR
program. They argued that experiencing PAR
is a must if relevance of research results is a true goal. They said
that rigor can also be achieved if certain precautions are taken. In
particular, an analysis of a PAR should: include views from all
participants, alternative explanations to the action progress must be
explored, and all details of the action must be articulated to constitute
``good'' science.
With respect to the interest problem, von Hippel (1988), in his research on the sources of innovations, discussed how close relationships between manufacturers and customers allowed customers to innovate on the products, thereby benefiting from better products in conjunction with manufacturers' success. A closer look at the phenomenon showed that innovations made by customers were made when they were cost effective from the customer viewpoint, and innovations by manufacturers were made when they were beneficial from the manufacturers viewpoint. Therefore, it may not be accurate to attribute the innovation to close relationships, but to the satisfaction of selfish interests. In another study, von Hippel (1987) showed that practitioners from competing firms engaged in communication. He explained it by a model showing that in certain situations such communication may be beneficial to both companies. He did not consider, however, the plausible explanation that the communicating practitioners have different interests than those of their companies, and that they may engage in communication benefiting them but harming their companies. These examples further demonstrate the difficulty of understanding why and how fruitful interactions between manufacturers and customers, practitioners from competing companies, or researchers and low-ranking organizational members, can be facilitated.
Design
Urban design practice is slowly, but constantly, moving towards
incorporating user concerns into the design process
[Hulchanski1977, Huls1986, Susskind and Elliott1983].
The relatively smooth and continuous spread of customers' participation in
urban design in many countries points to the high acceptance of such
practices; it is based on democratic principles that do not risk any of the
participating parties. Note that such participation may
sometime require the development of new design concepts such as the
support-infill concept for housing [Carp1986]. The volume
edited by Sanoff (1978) went further than
discussing the participation process from the designer standpoint by
providing potential participating communities with information about design
knowledge and participation.
The situation in engineering design is more complex than the one in urban design. In what follows I mainly concentrate on its status in the U.S. Forced by the problems faced by design practice and their serious consequences on industrial competitiveness, the engineering design research community in the U.S. tried to understand the problems and propose solutions [National Research Council1991]. As seen from problems in implementation research, a positivist rhetoric used in writing some of the conclusions of the above study, such as
manufacturing firms should recognize the leverage afforded by engineering design and move to take advantage of it; implement a comprehensive, coherent product realization practices; create a supportive environment for design; establish dedicated functional change agents to implement new practices and organizations; ... continually and formally seek and incorporate the best practices as they evolve; and adopt modern management accounting systems;'' (p. 68; my emphasis)does not serve the purpose of the study. Demands from industry, without taking into account the social and cultural issues involved are unlikely to be taken seriously. Furthermore, as Hughes (1991, p. 22) argued in another publication of the American National Academy Press, such demands reflect a reductionist and distracting view.
To illustrate this distracting view, in the introduction to another document
published by the National Academy Press [Sladovich1991], White, the
president of the National Academy of Engineering, said that the views of
Hollomon, the founder of the Academy, on the challenges of engineering are
still valid thirty years after their exposition. A closer examination of
Hollomon's views, reprinted in that document, suggests that the ignorance of
his challenges reflects a deeper problem than one that can be solved by
making sure that industry uses research results. Hollomon starts by saying
``I turn my attention from science to engineering--from understanding to
doing.'' (p. 104) This statement seemingly modified his focus from the
quest for knowledge or truth to the meaning of
technology in society and the interpretation of that meaning. Hollomon proposed potential solutions to the
problem of practice, such as the establishment of research laboratories in
industry, the support of research aimed at understanding the issues in
knowledge transfer from science to industry, and the education of engineers
with sociology in addition to science. Nevertheless, Hollomon maintained the
elitistic view of science as the only mechanism for seeking the truth, and
consequently, as history has showed, his ideas have not attracted
attention.
The National Research Council report, previously discussed, also recommended advancing design education and design research. Since these recommendations may be viewed as proposed policies, they are subjected to the same implementation issues discussed before. Note that some of the recommendations for design researchers, such that they should engage in industrial relationships and even become industrial interns for a certain period of time, can be easily enforced if, for example, federal funding becomes contingent upon fulfilling these requirements. A soft version of this idea is implemented in the Engineering Research Center program of the U.S. National Science Foundation [National Research Council1986b]; the program demands that centers develop partnership with industry. This however, rarely guarantees that real problems are addressed in research or that research results become valuable in practice. Some researchers, such as Bucciareli (1988) or Hales (1987), did not wait to be forced to establish relations with industry and performed design studies in actual industrial setting, understanding that a better appreciation of design can be conceived through properly studying actual design practice.
Within another fragment of the design research community, problems observed in design practice in the U.S. have resurrected the old debate about the need for design science. Calls advocating for the push towards design science have been coming from system sciences [Warfield1990b], from social sciences, albeit with a strong positivist view [Simon1981], and from engineering [Dixon1987]. Design science, will culminate as a host of theories that are derived by the scientific method, can explain and predict phenomena, and can control and manipulate situations (including humans within these situations).
Outside the U.S., several design theories, founded mainly on systems science or philosophy, were developed in the past [Gasparski1984, Hubka and Eder1988, Yoshikawa1981]. While Gasparski (1981) argued for participation in design, similarly to the methodology I propose, Hubka and Eder, and Yoshikawa concentrated on the technical knowledge involved in design.
Unfortunately, according to Ullman's (1991) analysis, the situation of design research in the U.S. is in a bad state. Only very few researchers are engaged in searching for philosophical foundations for design research, while ignoring that such omission may lead to the formulation of flowed design theories.
It is an unfortunate fact that even those favoring advancing design theory or science rarely advance it. Dixon (1987) criticized this situation while discussing proposals for getting research grants: ``Proposals rarely advance theories or hypotheses. When they do, it is rarely a testable theory or hypothesis. When it is testable, actual testing is rarely proposed. When a test is proposed, it is rarely well conceived.'' (p. 147)
In a recent study [Reich1991a, Reich1991b], I tried to address Dixon's concern by discussing methodological issues of design research. In these papers, I demonstrated the benefits from iterative theorizing and experimental testing to the quality of both a mathematical theory of design and an experimental design system. Therefore, these papers can be of value to those developing a theory of design, and especially to those advocating for a Popperian notion of scientific method. These papers, however, did not address the social aspects so crucial for design.
Konda, Monarch, Sargent, and Subrahmanian (1992) went further and explicitly criticized the call for design science as a collection of theories derived by any universal method. Konda et al. based their analysis on the philosophy of science, the largest single subject in philosophy, even though not the only relevant to design. Konda et al. nevertheless used it since it was most appealing to their audience; if they could base an argument on this branch of philosophy, instead of on the philosophy of sociology, they could make a stronger impact on their audience. Hence, by showing that scientific progress cannot be accounted for by any universal method, as demonstrated by the historical analysis of Feyerabend (1975) and Kuhn (1962), they correctly argued that one cannot conceive of a universal method for supporting the progress of design processes.
After rejecting the notion of general methods for determining design
progress, Konda et al. promoted the idea of shared memory as a
unifying theme for research and practice. Shared memory can promote sharing
the meaning of requirements and design actions and keep historical data for
future use. This study will suggest that the next question
to address is how to create facilities for communication that can promote
learning and thus can lead to and support such sharing, or to put it
differently, the next crucial question is: ``how shared memory is
possible?''
The relations between theory and practice discussed before do not lend
themselves to a clear resolution. While I just proposed what I perceive to
be a crucial research question for design research, it is by no means
accepted by design theorists. Most design theorists will simply dismiss the
TPP and continue to pursue their common research agenda. I, on the other
hand, hope to have raised doubts about the easy resolution of the TPP and
explained that the differing and sometimes contradicting or antagonistic
viewpoints about the TPP do not help shed light on potential solutions.
Reinharz (1990) also discussed the relations between research groups
favoring the positivist and alternative paradigms (e.g., constructivism,
critical theory) in sociology. She portrayed a
grim situation of either implicit ignorance or explicit antagonism towards
the ``rival'' paradigm. Presently, the ``alternative'' group is an
oppressed minority. Since most sociology departments in American
universities are positivists, they do not hire professors from, and do not
train researchers in, the alternative paradigms thereby contributing to the
present tendency. Through the lack of training, the positivists constantly
deprived their younger generation from making a thoughtful choice about
their research paradigm. The inferior status of the alternative paradigms
is manifested even in the use of prejudiced metaphors such as gender to
describe the paradigms (e.g., the male positivist and the female
alternative).
What is the essence of these contradictions? For Bernstein, it will be a consequence of the ``Cartesian Anxiety.'' (1983, p. 16-20) This anxiety is the experience that a foundation for our knowledge, an Archimedean point, is nowhere to be found and the fear that this may lead to ``relativism, skepticism, historicism and nihilism.'' (p. 2-3) I claim that this anxiety is the expression of an oppressive state of affairs we inherited. Similar observations have been made by others [Geuss1981, Habermas1971, Maxwell1984, Reason1988].
Not only are members of the alternative paradigms oppressed, but I argue
that also the positivists cannot escape oppression or loss of meaningful
activity. To advance
their career, American researchers submit themselves to the unfortunate
publish or perish
research paradigm. The publication of many papers requires engaging in many
large fanciful projects that are often expensive. In addition, researchers
``hire'' groups of cheap graduate students to produce research results.
Therefore, instead of doing research, presumably the reason the positivists
chose their profession, researchers become administrators and fund-raisers
working ``around-the-clock'' to maintain a high positive cash flow.
Consequently, the cost of projects or the success of the fund-raising
activity become a major criteria for evaluating research or researchers.
Moreover, members of the community find themselves spending substantial time
in reviewing the submissions of papers and proposals of their peers. While
this is a distorted situation, it is not the end of affairs; without
noticing, ``research participants becomes [sic] objects--targets,
others to be acted upon--rather than agents who work to understand and
change their own situations.'' ([Lather1990], p. 327)