This section starts part III of the study. The previous parts established the existence and prevalence of the TPP across significant aspects of human inquiry and technology and located its development and cultural and philosophical backgrounds. This part proposes a preliminary solution path and demonstrates its use in design research and the study of technology.
The hypothesis
I start by hypothesizing that
humans continuously engage in designing their experiences in the world as a way of behaving.
The design hypothesis can be viewed as equating behaving with designing and interpretation. I will not try to defend this hypothesis; instead, I will use it for explaining other concepts while mentioning that others have articulated ideas about the generality of design as a human activity [Petroski1992], its epistemological values [Perkins1986], its ontological consequences [Hickman1990], and its existential meaning [Florman1976].
The design of experiences and the use of available or the development of new technology to implement them involve many people: philosophers, researchers, designers, manufacturers, distributors, and customers. All these participants engage in design. As philosophers we design arguments against and in favor of specific positions. As researchers of design, we design design-prescriptions or design tools, or study the work of human designers. As manufacturers, we design production plans and tools. As product distributors, we design lines of products, advertisements, and sales strategies. Finally, as consumers, we design our experiences and buy products that allow for their contemplation.
Traditionally, according to positivism, the participants in technological
change are perceived as elements of a chain, where each link is developing a
theory that the next link needs or even ought to practice. Figure
1 shows a chain with several elements relevant to the present
discussion. In the
figure, forward arrows mean the transfer of design for implementations and
backward arrows mean the feedback of experience. For example, philosophers
of science develop theories about how progress in knowledge accumulation is
achieved and researchers are supposed to practice them; researchers
develop design theories and expect designers to use them; and designers
develop theories about what customers need and expect customers to buy
their products.
Clearly the process is not always theorizing and implementation. For example, researchers do not practice methodologies developed by philosophers; rather, philosophers, such as Kuhn and Feyerabend, try to formulate descriptive theories about how science actually progresses. Nevertheless, the theory-practice metaphor unifies the relationships between all the participants in technological change. I now elaborate on the relationships between the customer, the designer, the design researcher, and the philosopher.
Figure 1: The theory-practice chain
The consumer engages in design; by selecting goods he or she determines his
or her experiences in the world. The consumer, the last link in the
technological chain, is the one that actually probes the world with the
products of theories developed by remote participants in technological
developments. The consumer's experiences with the world can be divided into two
classes of relations [Ihde1979]: embodiment, manifested in
acts such as driving a car that is well designed, or hermeneutic,
manifested in acts such as driving a car badly designed. The first relation
allows experiencing the world, without paying attention to the product used.
the product becomes a transparent extension of the customer. In contrast,
the second relation may amplify, reduce, or introduce new experiences not
relevant to the original function of the product. In
a description of an experience, holding a stick against a trunk of a tree,
Buber's maintained that a genuine dialogue or experience require both
relations, ``here, where I held the stick, and there, where it touched the
bark. Appearing to be only where I was, I nonetheless found myself there,
too, where I found the tree. At that time dialogue appeared to me.''
([Buber1964], p. 47)
The designer engages in a practice by creating designs. If the designer is fortunate, he or she enjoys this creative experience independent of its outcome; this experience is existential [Florman1976]. Unfortunately, this experience is not free; the designer is forced to produce marketable artifacts that will maintain his or her job. Therefore, the designer turn to design ``practical'' artifacts. Gradually, the designer may develop an ability to enjoy the experience of designing successful products; some designers will even state that their highest satisfaction is from seeing others gain pleasure experiencing their designs. Rewards such as pay increase add to the designer's experience, but it remains fundamentally different from the existential pleasure. The concentration of designers on practical products may not be the result of their, but that of their consumers choice who by designing their experiences, drive designers towards designing specific products. The interpretation of the designer experiences as embodiment or hermeneutic is complex. The experience a designer has from building artifacts can be perceived as an embodiment relation; the experience with the design tools while designing can be perceived as a hermeneutic relation; and the assimilation of customer experiences can be perceived as a remote embodiment or hermeneutic relation depending on its type. A different perspective can result in different interpretations of these relations. It is almost clear that the experience through other humans create another dichotomy of relation: immediate and deferred. The deferred relation becomes hard to appreciate when approaching the left of the chain towards the philosophers.
The design researcher also produces designs: prescriptions of how design ought to be done or design tools. Although the researcher does not do it usually, he or she should also engages in designing his or her research methodology [Rzevski1981]. Currently, funding agencies--the ``customers'' of research--still allow researchers to engage in ``basic'' research, namely, the creation of knowledge about design that, in turn, is expected to be useful in practice. As discussed in the beginning of this study, this expectation has no basis. When economy declines this fortunate situation may terminate. Therefore, researchers who design their experiences by enhancing the potential for designers' experiences, which in turn is conditioned by their customers' experiences, may have better chances of sustaining their experiental setup.
Philosophers may explore the technological world via phenomenological exercises [Ihde1979] or other methods. Usually, their exercises will be simple or limited by current technology. Philosophers can extend their experiences by analyzing imagery situations such as those stemming from science fiction, of which Orwell's 1984 is a good example. Not only can philosophers use artifacts generated by others, but they themselves can (and probably should) actively and fruitfully engage in design activities [Sloman1988].
Interpretations
The unifying view of experience design provides the baseline for several interpretations of the design hypothesis. In the utilitarian interpretation, which is favored by positivism, the hypothesis can be rephrased as: maximizing one's own ability to design requires maximizing the abilities of the rest to design as well. The design hypothesis suggests that this goal not only requires that each participant extends and maintains his or her ability to design and carry out experiences, but that the senses from designs or experiences depend on the other participants' senses. While examples such as those described by von Hippel show that relationships of need and dependency can be explained by utilitarianism, the tendency of the utilitarians would be to maximize their utility by ignoring or exploiting others. This interpretation does not offer a solution to the TPP.
The second interpretation is ideological: all humans have an equal right to exercise their designs. This interpretation also addresses the ethics of design (or praxis in general). It is an ethics of responsibility of acting within a group context, in situations with moral ambiguities, utilizing the best tools to result morally and politically effective consequences [Partridge1985]. While I support this interpretation, I do not expect those who prosper in the current status quo to shell off their privileges. In fact, with respect to researchers, I expect them to openly advocate for the same right the design hypothesis claims, but take one of at least two possible complementary positions: (1) The knowledge they generate by their ``designs'' is for the sake of knowledge; their activity is value-free and it is the responsibility of the one who uses it to do it ``properly.'' (2) Society has given researchers, or more properly, ``scientists,'' the legitimacy to find new knowledge and they only exercise their agent's privileges.
The third interpretation relies on Habermas' communicative action
theory [Braaten1991, Habermas1979, Pusey1987].
Since design is a social activity, its conception and execution require the ability
to communicate effectively. A good quality design (which is itself a concept
constructed through consensus building) depends upon the ability to arrive
at a consensus after arguing through raising validity claims. The quality
further depends on the equal participation of the people affected by the
design. Such dependency can create a common goal, and establish a
collective activity in which the facilitation of self-experiences is
permitted and enhanced by others' ability to experience.
The fourth interpretation relies on Buber's notion of a dialogue. A true dialogue emerges when both relations: embodiment and hermeneutic exists. Through the dialogue, a unity emerges that maintains the duality of the participants [Bergman1991]. Designing is a social process, ``Man has always had his experiences as I, his experiences with others, and with himself, but it is as We, ever again as We, that he has constructed and developed a world out of his experiences.'' ([Buber1966a], p. 107)
Buber existentialism is significantly different from the existential nature of the engineer activities as describe by Florman (1976). For Buber, the dialogue is the condition of existence. A monologue of an engineer with his or her world may lead to the achievement goals but it cannot inject life into the engineer however pleasurable the creation may be. Therefore, the design hypothesis as a dialogue has a true existential and not just ideological meaning. The openness required in a dialogue further sheds light on the sources of creativity in design. Design as a goal-oriented problem solving is dead and routine, design as a dialogue is alive and creative.
While all four interpretations are different, the three latter share the ideological concern to equality of participation in the process of design. They share an understanding that any part of their foundations is subjected to criticism; in fact, they invite it, and on equal grounds. Their development just a process of design.
In previous sections I discussed the theoretical and political aspects of the TPP, their relations to technology and design, and the design hypothesis. It is time to put the analysis into practice and show its application to design research and practice.
First, I adopt the dualistic mind-body view and maintain it through the three analogues: mind-body, science-technology, and theory-practice. This is in contrast to the traditional positivist view which favors the contradictory materialistic-mind-body/idealist-science-technology view and the one dominating design research. This profound difference is manifested in the interpretation of the TPP.
The traditional positivist will solve the TPP by using the ``market economy'' paradigm. In that, researchers (designers) study the market by objectifying it via the materialistic mind-body view to find needs that require new theories (designs). Thereafter, researchers (designers) develop theories (designs), via the idealist science-technology view, that may or may not be used by designers (customers). To save themselves the burden of engaging in actions in the world in order to test their claims, researchers (designers) will isolate themselves from the market by establishing criteria for quality that are independent of market choices. Tolerating such an approach renders the solution of the TPP impossible.
The new methodology follows the dialogical interpretation, while borrowing from the communicative interpretation for supporting the former. It guarantees the fulfillment of the ideological concern and may borrow methods from the communicative interpretation. While it does not rely on the utilitarian interpretation, it promises to result in meaningful benefits for all individuals. The methodology is not a fixed one, it is not even well defined, not because the study is immature, but because it cannot be defined without practice and it can never be fixed. Nevertheless, a starting point for a methodological inquiry of design can be described and practiced. While it maintains the duality of philosophers, researchers, designers, etc., it unites them as a whole through a collaborative dialogue that enables the mutual extension of their experiences.
Figure 2 illustrates the new direction in design research and practice. The practice of design is denoted by the small dashed ellipse containing designers and customers and is called participatory design [Reich et al1992]. While it has been discussed and experimented with in the last three decades [Cross1972, Namioka and Schuler1990, Rosenbrock1989, Sanoff1978], it is not prevalent as a significant way of designing. The practice of research should not be different given the design hypothesis, but except for few examples such as [Piela et al1992, Whyte1991], in an activity called participatory action research, participation in research is even rarer than participation in design.
Figure 2: The theory-practice chain
Note that once we observe that each participant must become member of several collaborative activities (e.g., designers with consumers and designers with researchers), the scope of the methodology expands further. The new practice of research (design) requires that researchers (designers) expand their horizon of inquiry by studying the complete process of technological change rather than the small, isolated world of designers (consumers). Research will therefore be a collaborative process of researchers, designers and other relevant participants [Palumbo and Calista1990, Reason1988, Smith and Dainty1991, Whyte1991].
Ideally the scope will expand to include all participants potentially
affected by a specific research or design, thereby extending the scope of
any activity further into the grey area in Figure 2. Moreover,
the collaborative process must consist of a genuine dialogue between all the
participants, necessarily including the social impact of all
activities.
The participatory inquiry has several characteristics: (1) Everybody learn in the course of the inquiry. In research, researchers learn about the problem faced by designers and designers learn about what is possible, thereby allowing the reformulation of the original problem. The views, understanding, and needs of all the participants evolve throughout the research. (2) Since research is intimately linked to practice--an actual design problem--it cannot be divorced from pragmatics. Therefore, both participants make compromises in order to achieve actions. The knowledge generated from such research activity is context dependent, therefore hard to generalize. Nevertheless it is powerful to impact practice. (3) When practicing research, participants must maintain their openness about the activity, and constantly question its practical usefulness and moral appropriateness. These considerations can override the practical concerns discussed in item (2) through the participation of the customers of the products. (4) Participation means that the control of research is shared by all participants, a sharp contrast to current practice. (5) Participation means that a genuine dialogue takes place. It involves establishing a reciprocal, intimate, dependency relationships, where each participants has equal standing in the process. (6) A genuine participation must allow the alternation between action and reflection, or between relationships and space. This tension must be maintained. Therefore, participants do not only build a whole, but also maintain their identity. These characteristics and others must be developed and evolve through future participatory inquiry.
Recent research in computer supported cooperative work can potentially be used in participatory activities. First, they can be developed evolutionary by participation to support cooperative work, and furthermore, they can record cooperative activities and make them available for later examinations. Such tools make sure that the ontological change of internal ideas to communicated ideas as discussed before, is not reversed. Tools that are designed to operate in this mode may formalize ideas in pre-defined data-structure and potentially extract design ``rationale'' from the information stored. This approach, however, does not support the ontological change that Buber describes: the change from the I-It relation to the I-Thou relationship. A tool that can potentially provide support for such change and that is currently under development is / [Levy et al1993, Subrahmanian et al1991]. / is based on the idea that shared memory and design participation are unifying themes in design research and practice [Konda et al1992, Reich et al1992]. While Konda et al. established the principle of shared memory, and Reich et al. established the role of participation in design, the discussion in this study further details the some preliminary characteristics of participation and how it may be supported.
Currently, / provides mechanisms for flexibly modeling concepts at various levels using user-defined modifiable languages. The models created are stored and may be used in the future. While a limited sense of a shared memory can be evolved through the storage and manipulation of the models stored, its true creation involves a continuous dialogical process between the design participants. Communication and exchange of ideas, facilitation of incremental change and reversal of choices, are mandatory concepts that are central to obtaining a genuine dialogue between participants. While one may start creating languages that support the raising and defending of the three types of Habermas' validity claims, the participants themselves must have the ability to define, create and evolve these mechanisms through, and to further enhance, a genuine dialogue between them. The possibility of shared memory is dependent on these facilities.
Note that the use of computational support tools does not mean that the materialistic mind-body view is adopted, rather, the tools are created as support for human design, human interpretation of data, and human dialogue. In fact, I agree that the extensive use of computer tools may suppress designers' awareness to critical aspects of their problems [Petroski1992]. No assumption about the general applicability of information recorded (which some may call knowledge) is made.
The evolutionary nature of design is evident. Tools that support
participatory design enhance design practice, they constantly move the
boundaries of what design is. Therefore, the
study of design will never end: good news for design researchers who will
always ``stay in business;'' if, of course, they are willing to contribute
to this change through participation.
One should make no mistakes that participation in research involves simple modifications to practice. It requires that the quality of research (and researchers) be evaluated based on the impact it leaves on practice, its political and ethical adequacy, and its contribution to the design ability of others. It prevents arbitrary questions to be explored, rather, it establishes priorities on more moral grounds to be determined by participation. Researchers will not be able to argue for their eternal role as supplier of knowledge: they will be equal participants in praxis.
While participation is an ideal, its actual application and its consequences are subject to experimentation and criticism. Its adoption in research must not only survive the fierce objection of positivism, but also its practical implications to the generation of good quality (in the operational and moral sense) products must be constantly evaluated. Furthermore, the concept itself may undergo revisions and even disappear, to give way to new methodologies that better address the TPP.
Finally, I would like to name the new methodology. Buber's concept of a dialogue is more revealing than the notion of participation. It is a continuous participatory process that anticipates the creation of new things, for the good of all. A dialogue that includes people and nature has the potential of designing. In general an dialogue is all that is needed to name the new approach, but I'll use a Dialogical Inquiry (DI) to further stress the creative, dynamic nature, and the seeking out properties of design.
It is clear that the product of design is artifacts to which we adapt, and those that we use. These artifacts shape the environment in which we live. We not only experience nature, but also man-made objects and ideas. Nevertheless, the understanding of technology as an activity that produces artifacts falls short of conveying the structure of the activity, its meaning, and its impact on society [Mitcham and Mackey1972].
Mitcham and Mackey suggested that a better understanding of technology can evolve from studying it using one of three philosophically adequate approaches: anthropological, sociological, and epistemological. The anthropological approach deals with the relation of technology to nature and man; the sociological approach deals with the relations of technology to modern society in a historical perspective; and the epistemological approach deals with the relation of technology to the structure and nature of human knowledge. A slightly different perspective of studying technology reveals three core questions related to the three above approaches. The first question is ethical: what is the impact of technology on society and how does the study of technological change it? The second question is practical: what is the product of the study of technology? The third question is methodological: how do we study technology and how does it affect our chances to answer the these three questions?
The ethical question concerns basic studies on the personal and social impacts of technology [Bender1987, Brown1971, Mitcham and Mackey1972] and also addresses new ethical problems emerging from technological progress, such as the need to reformulate life or death issues in light of new life saving devices [Ihde1979], or the need to study the issue of professional ethics in various disciplines [Durbin1987].
I propose that a crucial question to be addressed is how technology affects human ability to participate in a genuine dialogue. Bergman (1991) clearly interpreted Buber on this subject.
A technological summit has been reached in our time, yet technology was developed at the expense of human relationships:Arnett (1986) also provided a similar interpretation of Buber on the impact of technology on human ability to follow the ``narrow ridge'' way. The further study of this impact of technology is central to answering other ethical questions concerning technology.The improvement of the capacity for experience and use generally involves a decrease in man's power to relate--that power which alone can enable man to live in the spirit ([Buber, 1964,] p. 89)When the spirit loses its power, the terror of the It, the fear of the world of objects and the horror of the atom bomb assail man. (p. 235-236)
Common products of an inquiry, including technology studies, are often described as: knowledge, readily usable production procedures, artifacts, awareness to ethical issues, etc. These products, however, have too much pragmatic connotation, once they are distilled from the processes and contexts that generated them. I argue that an important product of technology studies should be an evolving concept of how a genuine dialogue can be established, supported, and enriched.
The methodological question deals with the procedure of studying and recognizing technological progress. The answer to this question influences the way the practical, the ethical questions, and even this question itself are addressed. Buber's dialogue as discussed in the previous section provides the basis for an activity that has a great promise of addressing the crucial problems of technology.
There is a hidden circle in the three questions concerning technology. The methodology is predicated on dialogue, the product is defined as a better understanding of how genuine dialogues can be facilitated, and the ethical concerns is addressed by demanding the existence of a genuine dialogue whose practice is to be evolved. It should not be surprising to find such a circular dependency. Technology constantly changes the environment, we find ourselves experiencing new sensations and adapt to new circumstances. Therefore, technology necessarily engages us in self-creation [Feibleman1982] that constantly circles through design, experience, and adaptation activities.
Buber's dialogue is a whole that addresses at least three of the core concerns of technology. Arnett (1986) had described it as a Copernican revolution: shifting from an ``internalized and possessive view of communication to a narrow ridge perspective.'' (p. 57) While I only briefly touched its implication to understanding technology, Arnett elaborated on its implications to contemporary technological society. The meaning and implications of the dialogue are by no means exhausted and deserved further examination.
In this paper, I have tried to elaborate on the TPP of design and technology and propose a research methodology that addresses it. I can use the design hypothesis and the concept of dialogue to summarize the study from a different perspective. Part I demonstrated the unfortunate status of the TPP, imposing unwarranted constraints that limit or deprive people from designing, executing, or interpreting their experiences. Furthermore, the TPP prevents people from engaging in genuine dialogues. Some people (as participants in some aspect of technology) may feel being, but all are implicitly, in an oppressive, limiting state. Part II elucidated the background of the problem mainly focusing on the recent development of the problem and its ties to culture and philosophical thought. It demonstrated the severity of the problem and its resistance to simple solutions. Part III illustrated a methodology that can emancipate from the present situation. Since the methodology is itself a design about how design should be executed, it is reflective and invites criticism.
The new methodology will not disseminate easily. It threatens to remove sources of power that some people enjoy as summarized by Guba (1990).
Power and politics will play an important role as the paradigm dialog unfolds. When I used the term hegemony earlier, in suggesting that power has passed from positivists to postpositivists, I meant to state forcefully that there is a great deal more at stake in the paradigm dialog than simply a debate over a few conceptual issues. Hegemony implies least control over appointment, promotion, tenure, publication, legitimation, status, training, accountability, funding, research agendas, and myriad other factors that determine the quality of our professional lives. ([Guba1990], p. 375; emphasis in the original)
In this paper I chose to follow a different approach than that described by Bernstein (1983). He explained that
because philosophers like Rorty and the edifying thinkers that he admires see the trap of trying to prove that the objectivist is fundamentally mistaken, they employ a form of indirect communication and philosophic therapy that is intended to loosen the grip that objectivism has upon us--a therapy that seeks to liberate us from the obsession with objectivism and foundationalism. (p. 9)While I acknowledge the same trap, I selected the method of direct criticism. I have referenced many philosophers and practitioners discussing the TPP and their proposed solutions, some of which have been put to successful preliminary practice; while other solutions, proposed from within the positivist camp, are bound to fail. These references should demonstrate the breadth and depth of the manifestation of the TPP. In choosing the direct criticism approach, I have already violated the concept of participation, let myself be driven by the ideological value of participation, hence opening the avenue for criticism on that account. In spite of this violation, I hope that a genuine dialogue can still proceed and I predict that it will. This prediction, in turn, completes the requirements for participation in research or dialogical inquiry to be a critical theory [Geuss1981].
I can be mistaken in the design hypothesis or in any of its consequences since none of its interpretations can be proved. On the other hand, they cannot be disproved. In any case, any opposition will have to locate the disagreements at the foundation level, rather than at the details of a specific research project. Such critical level will promote fruitful dialogue on the presuppositions of opinions. Thus, even if the methodology proposed will be reformulated, as it will, the critical theory programme will survive.
Finally, this paper, including the research methodology I have outlined, is a design of a ``narrow-ridge'' [Buber1966b] for a dialogue. Its value depends on the experiences and actions it elicits from its readers and not on its eternal existence or truth value; for as a design, it is bound to have a limited life-span. My hope is that the experiences it elicits will serve to approach The Third Alternative:
In the most powerful moments of dialogic, where in truth ``deep calls unto deep,'' it becomes unmistakably clear that it is not the wand of the individual or of the social, but of a third which draws the circle round the happening. On the far side of the subjective. on this side of the objective, on the narrow ridge, where I and Thou meet, there is the realm of ``between.''This reality, whose disclosure has begun in our time, shows the way, leading beyond individualism and collectivism, for the life decision of future generations. Here the genuine third alternative is indicated, the knowledge of which will help to bring about the genuine person again and to establish genuine community. ([Buber1966b], p. 55)
Acknowledgments
Discussions with Shoulamit Milch-Reich, Suresh Konda, Ira Monarch, and Eswaran Subrahmanian helped to shape the ideas expressed in this study. The mistakes in this design, however, remain mine.